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THE ROMAN LAW ROOTS OF COPYRIGHT
Russ VERSTEEG*
INTRODUCTION
Modern technology-specifically the computer and its uses via
the Internet-increasingly demands that we reconsider and rethink
copyright law.' This phenomenon is not new. Before computers
made us reassess copyright law, other once-new forms of copying,
communication, and information transmission did the same for the
following: the satellite,2 the photocopier,' the VCR,4 radio,5 sound
recording,6 photography,7 the printing press,8 and various forms of
television,9 including cable television. 10 Attempting to keep up with
technology is one of the things that makes law, and particularly copy-
right law, so challenging. The law is constantly scurrying to keep pace
with changing technology and societal expectations that evolve in the
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1. See, e.g., Monroe E. Price, Reexamining Intellectual Property Concepts: A Glimpse into the
Future Through the Prism of Chakrabarty, 6 CARDozo ARTS & ENr. LJ. 443, 443 (1987)
("There is reason for a reexamination of the doctrinal bases of intellectual property law...
since intellectual property doctrines are playing an increasingly important role in control-
ling information distribution in the formation of new technology.").
2. See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 8.20, at 264-65 (2d ed.
1995) ("Satellite carriers, by retransmitting from satellite to earth, are essentially engaging
in secondary transmissions of copyrighted works.").
3. See id. § 10.11 [A],[C], at 328, 330 (describing how the photocopier allows dissemi-
nation of copyrighted works "in ways which were not thought possible until recently").
4. See id. § 10.11 [A], at 328 (explaining that the videocassette recorder empowers any-
one to "reproduce and transmit a copyrighted work cheaply and inexpensively").
5. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 162-64 (1975)
(holding that a restaurant owner's radio reception of music was not a performance and did
not violate the copyright of the owners).
6. See LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 3.19, at 99-101 (discussing the uniqueness of sound
recordings and its copyright issues).
7. See id. § 1.3, at 6 n.22 (noting that the 1865 revisions to the Copyright Act made
photographs a copyrightable subject matter).
8. See id. § 1.2, at 3-5 (reviewing the origin of copyright statutes in response to print-
ing press use in England).
9. See, e.g., Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968)
(dealing with the copyright ramifications of community antenna television [CATV] as op-
posed to traditional television broadcasts).
10. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (1994) (setting forth the licensing requirements for
secondary transmission by cable television systems).
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wake of changing technology. For example, for the average person,
the concepts of "copying" and "fair use" have changed as technology
has provided us with the capability of copying greater volumes of ma-
terial at greater speeds.
When judges and lawmakers confront novel issues, the "law" is
rarely clear. In the absence of precedent, they must resolve novel is-
sues by considering how matters such as policy, fairness, economic ef-
ficiency, and fundamental legal principles can help them in their
decisionmaking. It is commonplace to trace the fundamental princi-
ples and the policies of American copyright back to the Constitu-
tion.'1 In doing so, it is not unusual to provide nodding reference to
the Statute of Anne and a handful of English cases that helped shape
the historical and the political basis for that progenitor of English
copyright law.12
While acknowledging these foundations of modern copyright,
this Article takes a different approach through the examination of the
Roman law roots of modern copyright. Although it is virtually certain
that the ancient Romans did not have a general law of copyright,13
they did develop the legal principles of property, contract, and liabil-
ity that have shaped many of the essential building blocks of American
11. See, e.g., LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 1.3, at 5-6 ("Although the colonies already had
their own forms of copyright laws, the Framers of the Constitution recognized the need for
a uniform law of copyright and patents." (footnote omitted)).
12. See id. § 1.2, at 5 (noting that the Statute of Anne "became the model for copyright
law in the United States").
13. SeeJ.A. CROOK, LAW AND LWE OF ROME 207 (1967) (stating that one of the general-
izations concerning Roman commercial law is that "[t] here was no law of patent or copy-
right, [and] no protection for property in ideas"); see also HANSJULIUS WOLFF, RoMAN LAw:
AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 58 (1951) (stating that "[a]ncient times did not know such a
thing as a copyright").
Matthews explained:
In Rome, where there were booksellers having scores of trained slaves to tran-
scribe manuscripts for sale, perhaps the successful author was paid for a poem,
but we find no trace of copyright or of anything like it. Horace speaks of a certain
book as likely to make money for a certain firm of booksellers. In the other Latin
poets, and even in the prose writers of Rome, we read more than one cry of
suffering over the blunders of the copyists, and more than one protest in anger
against the mangled manuscripts of the hurried servile transcribers. But nowhere
do we find any complaint that the author's rights have been infringed; and this,
no doubt, was because the author did not yet know that he had any wrongs.
Brander Matthews, The Evolution of Copyright, 5 POL. Sci. Q. 583, 586 (1890) (internal cita-
tion omitted). Additionally, Watson observed that Roman private law rarely manifested an
interest in what he calls "a public dimension." ALAN WATSON, THE SPIRIT OF ROMAN LAw 49
(1995). According to Watson, "[t]his absence of a public dimension is marked throughout
Roman private law and is one of its most characteristic features." Id. Since copyright, by its
very nature recognizes an important "public dimension," this absence may partially explain
why the ancient Romans failed to develop copyright law.
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copyright law today.' 4 Roman law precepts can clearly be seen in nu-
merous aspects of copyright doctrine: the essence of copyright as in-
tangible property;15 the nature of the public domain; 6 different types
of copyrightable works (works of authorship) and the sale of them;17
ownership of copyrights (including joint authorship and work for
hire);' and liability for copyright infringement.' 9 There is little
doubt that the greatest gift that the ancient Romans have left to pos-
terity has been their law and legal principles.2' This fact may be no
less true when it comes to copyright. Thus, it may occasionally prove
beneficial to look back to the Roman law origins of copyright when
seeking answers to the newest copyright questions.
Part I of this Article reviews some of the commonly acknowledged
sources of American copyright. Parts I-VII explore specific copyright
doctrines whose origins can be traced to preexisting tenets of ancient
Roman law: II. Roman Origins of Intangible Property; III. Copyright
as a Public Good: The Public Domain; IV. Copyrightable Subject Mat-
ter; V. Sale and Other Transfer of Intangibles; VI. Joint Authorship
and Work for Hire; and VII. Copyright Infringement.
I. COMMONLY ACKNOWLEDGED SOURCES OF AMERICAN
COPYRIGHT LAW
Virtually all writers who pause to mention the basis of modern
American copyright point directly to the precise and explicit language
in the Constitution. 2' This language empowers Congress to legislate
copyright laws, for the purpose of promoting the progress of science,
that give authors, for limited times, the exclusive rights to their writ-
14. See infra Parts II-VII.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Parts IV-V.
18. See infra Part VI.
19. See infta Part VII.
20. SeeJ.A.C. THOMAS, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAw 3 (1976) (maintaining that "it may be
safely said that... Roman Law was the great cultural legacy of the ancient western world to
its descendants"); ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW & COMPARATIVE LAw 3 (1991) ("Rome's
greatest legacy to the modern world is undoubtedly its private law. Roman law forms the
basis of all legal systems of Western Europe with the exception of England (but not Scot-
land) and Scandinavia."). Watson also noted that the influence of Roman law on the law
of England has also been significant, "much greater than is often admitted." Id.
21. See, e.g., LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 1.3, at 5 (noting that since little is known about the
Framer's mindset while drafting the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, "one
is left with the language of the Clause itself").
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ings.22 Most who have considered the matter thoughtfully have con-
cluded that the word "science" in this context means "knowledge,"
coming from the Latin "scientia."2 3 But long before the Founding Fa-
thers ever considered the issue of copyright, British legislators and
courts had worked out the basic policies and principles. 24 It was from
these foundations that the Constitutional drafters borrowed. Still,
copyright did not spring fully fledged like Athena from Zeus' brow in
British law either. It was a gradual development.
Many earmark the invention of the printing press as the water-
shed date for the beginning of copyright as a practical concept.25
Commentators have argued that printing technology provided the
first realistic opportunity for authors to recognize the potential eco-
nomic benefit from their work.2 6 Indeed, we know that in 1469 the
lawmakers of Venice granted to John of Spira, a printer, the exclusive
rights to publish both Cicero's and Pliny's letters for five years.27 The
grant to John of Spira was only the beginning. Others in Venice and
elsewhere quickly jumped on the bandwagon and began seeking and
securing the exclusive privilege to publish particular works in specific
22. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
23. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) ("Innovation, advance-
ment, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a
patent system .... This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be
ignored."); Infodeck v. Meredith-Webb Printing Co., Inc., 830 F. Supp. 614, 621 n.8 (N.D.
Ga. 1993) (noting that the term "science" in the Intellectual Property Clause of the Consti-
tution is "generally given its eighteenth century meaning of knowledge or learning" (citing
Graham, 383 U.S. at 5)).
24. See generally LEA FER, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 3-5 (chronicling the emergence of copy-
right law in England from 1476 through the early-eighteenth century).
25. See, e.g., id. § 1.2, at 3-4 (suggesting that the introduction of the printing press into
England, in 1476, while enriching publishers, also "threatened the Crown," who responded
with a system of regulation designed to control this "dangerous art"); Matthews, supra note
13, at 588 ("[T]he earliest legal recognition of his [the printer/publisher's] rights was
granted less than a score of years after the invention of printing had made the injury
possible.").
26. As Matthews explained:
Indeed, it was only after the invention of printing that an author had an awak-
ened sense of the injury done him in depriving him of the profit of vending his
own writings; because it was only after Gutenberg had set up as a printer, that the
possibility of definite profit from the sale of his works became visible to the
author.
Matthews, supra note 13, at 586.
27. See id. at 588 ("The Senate of Venice issued an order, in 1469, thatJohn of Spira
should have the exclusive right for five years to print the epistles of Cicero and of Pliny."
(citation omitted)).
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localities.28 Thus, the mid- to late-fifteenth century experienced a rise
in the legal and social recognition of copyright; taking the guise of an
exclusive right granted by the state to a publisher.
In many respects, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries proved
to be crucial in establishing the patterns and theories that justified
copyright in England. By the early-sixteenth century, the Venetian
concept caught on as the British king began granting exclusive rights
to publish specific books to individual printers.29 In the meanwhile,
the printers guild-the Stationers Company-began, after a fashion,
to police itself by establishing a registry system whereby a printer regis-
tered individual books with the Company to secure the exclusive
rights of publication. 0 Thus, a printer was able to acquire exclusive
rights in two ways: (1) by royal grant; and, (2) by registration with the
Stationers Company.31 Consequently, and correspondingly, two theo-
ries of copyright evolved: (1) copyright as a legislative grant; and, (2)
28. See id. (stating that "[t]he habit of asking for a special privilege from the authorities
of the state wherein the book was printed spread rapidly" and providing Venice and other
Italian states as examples).
29. See W.F. Wyndham Brown, The Origin and Growth of Copyright, 34 LAW MAG. & REV.
54, 55 (1908) (describing how during the first half of the sixteenth century "[t]he Crown
• . .claimed prerogative rights, in the case of certain books, to grant the sole privilege of
printing them to its assigns").
30. See id. at 57 ("The person who had registered his rights in the books of the [Station-
ers] Company was the owner, and he might assign those rights to others, provided the title
of the assignee was also entered on the register."); see also Howard B. Abrams, The Historic
Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE
L. REV. 1119, 1135-36 (1983) ("Only members of the Company of Stationers could legally
print books and only books authorized by the Crown could be published." (citations omit-
ted)); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 517, 525 (1990) ("By letters Patent, the Queen granted exclusive rights of printing to
the members of the Stationers' Company.").
Holdsworth explained:
By registration [with the Stationers' Company] the printer or publisher got an
incontestable tide to the book registered in his name. It therefore tended to give
clearness and precision to the idea of literary property or copyright. The registers
show us the growth of this idea. Copyright is protected by the imposition of pen-
alties upon those who infringed it. It is assigned, sold, settled, given in trust; and
limited grants are made. Its duration is nowhere stated, unless it is expressly cre-
ated for a limited period. It is therefore most probable that it was perpetual; and
if we regard it, as it was then clearly regarded, as a form of property, it would
naturally be considered to be perpetual, unless a general enactment or order
could be pointed to which expressly limited it.
W.S. Holdsworth, Press Control and Copyright in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 29 YALE L.J. 841,
844 (1920) (footnotes omitted).
31. See Holdsworth, supra note 30, at 843 ("Unless a printer or publisher had a special
patent of privilege from the crown authorizing him to print a certain book, or certain
books of a defined class, he was expected to register with the [Stationers'] company all
books which he printed or published." (citing Arber, Transcript of the Stationers' Registers
(1875-77))).
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copyright as a natural right.3 2 On the one hand, the king granted
exclusive rights-suggesting that copyright was a right held by the
state that could be allocated as the Crown saw fit.33 On the other
hand, courts came to recognize copyright as a "natural right" of au-
thors and publishers34 that accrued as a result of the author's or pub-
lisher's labor in the creation of the literary work.35 One of the
significant outcomes, under either theory, was that copyright, as a dis-
tinct form of property, was legally recognized.36
And so, through the end of the seventeenth century in England,
the notion of copyright rested essentially on firm ground. Apparently,
publishers assumed that their natural, common law copyrights were
perpetual; only the royal grants were limited in duration. Although
32. See id. at 841 ("We shall see, too, that the differences between the control exercised
indirectly through the Stationers Company, and exercised directly by the crown, are at the
root of two very different theories as to the origin and nature of copyright."); Abrams
explained:
The champions of common law copyright argued that copyright was a natural
right of the author, arising from the act of creation, which was recognized by the
common law. The opponents of common law copyright either denied the exist-
ence of copyright as a common law right, or argued that it had been "impeached"
by the copyright statutes.
Abrams, supra note 30, at 1129. For a similar but somewhat different analysis, see LindaJ.
Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1532, 1539. Lacey maintained that
"[c]opyright can be considered either (1) a 'natural' right, (2) an artificial right created by
the legislature and the judiciary, or (3) a 'personal' right integral to an artist's very iden-
tity." Id.
33. See Lacey, supra note 32, at 1540-41 (maintaining that some "commentators and
historians argue vigorously that there never has been such a thing as a 'natural' right in
intellectual property, that any protection an artist enjoys exists solely through the preroga-
tive of the legislature" (citing Abrams, supra note 30, at 1128)).
34. See William E. Simonds, Natural Right of Property in Intellectual Production, 1 YALE LJ.
16, 19 (1891) (noting that in the 200 years prior to the passage of the Statute of Anne in
1710, a number of English courts had recognized a common law copyright). Simonds
defined a "natural right" as "a right pertaining to a person or his property, existing inde-
pendently of specific statute law, a right instinctively and universally recognized by all civi-
lized peoples and many uncivilized." Id. at 16.
35. See Brown, supra note 29, at 56 (stating that "there came to be recognised a sort of
Common law right of property in an author or bookseller to his own literary efforts and
work, provided that any exercise of such right did not affect those persons who had ob-
tained a grant from the Crown."); see also Lacey, supra note 32, at 1539 ("The natural rights
theory is based on the idea that 'whenever one mingles his effort with the raw stuff of the
world, any resulting product ought-simply ought-to be his."' (quoting Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compen-
sation"Law, 80 I-IARv. L. REv. 1165, 1204 (1967) (construingJohn Locke's The Second Trea-
tise of Government))).
36. See Holdsworth, supra note 30, at 845 (characterizing the development of copyright
as "the invention of [a] new form of property").
37. See Brown, supra note 29, at 60 (explaining that "authors generally believed that the
Statute [of Anne] did not interfere with their Common law right, to publish in perpetuity
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the Star Chamber had issued ordinances relating to copyright in 1586
and in 1637,38 the Statute of Anne, enacted in 1710, is acknowledged
by most as the truly significant grandparent of British (and therefore
American) copyright legislation.39 Authors40 and publishers initially
perceived the statute as a positive force.41 It provided them with legal
teeth and equipped them with remedies that included stiff financial
penalties for infringement.42 In addition to the remedies, however,
the Statute of Anne stated that the term of exclusive rights was
granted only for a specific, limited period of time.43 With regard to
the limited period of protection, legal Historian W.F. Wyndham
Brown wrote:
The Act imposed the desired penalties, and it was thought
that the times mentioned in the Act merely meant that the
imposition of such penalties was only to exist for the periods
named, by way of experiment. The authors generally be-
lieved that the Statute did not interfere with their Common
law right, to publish in perpetuity their literary property.44
their literary property."); see also Simonds, supra note 34, at 21 (noting that the common
law recognized copyright as perpetual up until the Statute of Anne in 1710).
38. See Abrams, supra note 30, at 1136 (noting that the Star Chamber Decrees of 1586
and 1637 permitted only members of the Stationers' Company to legally publish books and
provided that the Crown could decide which books could be published as well as seizing
and destroying unauthorized books and presses).
39. See LErAFER, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 3-5 (chronicling the development of copyright
law in England through the Statute of Anne, "which became the model for copyright law in
the United States"); Abrams, supra note 30, at 1139 (explaining that in 1710, Parliament
passed the Statute of Anne, "the first parliamentary copyright statute and the progenitor of
our contemporary copyright laws").
40. See Abrams, supra note 30, at 1139-40 ("Perhaps most significantly, the Statute of
Anne provided that an 'author' was the person initially entitled to copyright.").
41. See id. at 1140-41 (pointing out that "[flor the first time, the author as creator and
originator, became the source of the right of copy, and copyright was regarded as the
author's reward for his creative efforts" and that publishers would now have copyright pro-
tection that they did not have previously to 1710).
42. See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 7 (1967) (noting that of-
fenders of the Statute of Anne had to forfeit illegally copied books to the owners of the
books and to pay as damages one penny per sheet); Brown, supra note 29, at 60 (explain-
ing that the Statute of Anne imposed the penalties that authors desired for copyright
protection).
43. See Brown, supra note 29, at 59-60 (describing periods of protection from 14 years
up to 28 years); Yen, supra note 30, at 526 & n.55 (explaining that "the Statute [of Anne]
granted authors copyright terms of up to twenty-eight years for newly published works" and
that the "twenty-eight years consisted of an initial term of fourteen years, with a second
term available if the author was still living at the end of the first term" (citing 8 Anne ch. 19
(1710), reprinted in H. RANSOM, THE FIRsT COPYRIGHT STATUTE 117 (1956))).
44. Brown, supra note 29, at 60.
[VOL. 59:522
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As publishing became a lucrative business during the eighteenth cen-
tury, more and more companies entered into the competition, and, as
a result, they began testing the limits and interpretation of the Statute
of Anne.45 The critical question that emerged was whether copyright
was a perpetual right. Simply stated, many considered that the issue
turned on whether copyright was considered a natural right that ex-
isted at common law-in which case, the right, like most common law
property rights, should be perpetual-or whether copyright was a
grant from the state created by legislation-in which case, the govern-
ment could limit its duration.46  In 1769, in Millar v. Taylor,4 7 the
King's Bench ruled that copyright was a property right that existed at
common law.4" Nevertheless, a mere five years later in Donaldson v.
Beckett,49 the House of Lords decided, on the contrary, that copyright
was based on statute, not on common law. 5' Hence, when the drafters
45. See KAPtAN, supra note 42, at 22 (suggesting that because the "business of publish-
ing and distributing books [became] bigger, more competitive, [and] more impersonal;
the stakes were higher [and] the risks more serious" and, therefore, there was increased
pressure to determine the limits of literary ownership).
46. See Brown, supra note 29, at 61 ("'Did the Common law right of an author or book-
seller to publish his literary property in perpetuity, survive the time limitations imposed by
the Statute of Anne?' This was the question around which there raged one of the fiercest
storms in the annals of legal history.").
47. 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
48. Id. at 252, 257 (holding that authors have perpetual common law property rights in
their work independent of statutory rights); see also Abrams, supra note 30, at 1153 ("Millar
marked the great transition in legal thought to analyzing copyright as a right of the author
.... The majority reasoned that the author had a property right stemming from the act of
creation."); Holdsworth, supra note 30, at 858 ("The majority of the court of King's Bench
[in Milar] decided that [copyright] was a 'right of property' which existed at common
law"); Yen, supra note 30, at 528 (stating that "the decision in Millar v. Taylor is important
because it established a natural law theory of copyright alongside the economic approach
taken by the Statute of Anne").
49. 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.C. 1774).
50. Id. at 844, 846-47; see also KAPLAN, supra note 42, at 15 ("The Donaldson appeal suc-
ceeded in 1774 and the common law perpetuity was repelled and denied."); Brown, supra
note 29, at 62 (stating that in Donaldson, "[iut was held, that, even if there had been a right
to perpetuity in literary property at Common law, it was destroyed by the Statute of Anne,
and, that any proprietor of copyright had the exclusive right of multiplication only during
the periods of time allowed by the Statute"). For an interesting discussion of whether the
House of Lords made the correct decision in Donaldson v. Beckett, see Brown, supra note 29,
at 62-63. Much of Brown's article is an attempt to show that, due to mistaken judges and
historical accident, copyright lost its perpetual character, and that it was a mistake for
English courts to hold that an author's common law right expired after the statutory pro-
tection of the Statute of Anne's period of protection had run its course.
On the other hand, William Simonds has persuasively argued that, even if copyright is
deemed a natural common law right, it does not necessarily follow that it is a right that
must exist in perpetuity. See Simonds, supra note 34, at 23. According to Simonds:
Sometimes it has been argued that if the theory is correct that there is a natural
right of property in intellectual productions, it naturally and inevitably follows
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of the United States Constitution considered the matter less than a
score of years later, it was quite clear that they perceived copyright as a
limited grant bestowed by the government via statute.51 In 1834, the
United States Supreme Court held the same in Wheaton v. Peters.52
II. RoMAN ORIGINS OF INTANGIBLE PROPERTY
First, let us be frank. As was mentioned, it seems to be quite clear
that the ancient Romans did not develop a law of copyright.5 3 An-
cient authors borrowed wholesale from one another to a degree that
would easily be considered copyright infringement under modern
copyright laws. Generally speaking, authors, painters, and sculptors
were funded by wealthy patrons or worked on municipal projects
funded by governments.54 Thus, authors and artists had no need to
seek a financial reward through making multiple copies of their
that the producer or his representatives must have such right forever, and that
such an extraordinary consequence demonstrates the unsoundness of the theory.
Not at all. Natural right does not necessarily mean perpetual right. In all forms
of society all kinds of property are held under such conditions and limitations as
society deems reasonable. Under the right of eminent domain governments take
private property for public use, on suitable remuneration, when public necessity
and convenience demand it. In some cases private property is taken for public
use without compensation, notably when a man's building is torn down to pre-
vent the spread of a conflagration. The disposition of property by last will and
testament is regulated and limited by law.
Id.
Thus, Simonds concluded: "It is therefore entirely reasonable that society should set a
limit to the enjoyment of the natural right of property in intellectual productions." Id. at
24.
51. See generally LEAFFER supra note 2, § 1.8, at 15 (recognizing Congressional power to
legislate copyright and patent statutes by conferring limited monopolies on writings and
inventions); Abrams, supra note 30, at 1175-78 (construing James Madison's writings in The
Federalist to support the proposition that the Constitutional Convention did not support
the natural rights theory of perpetual common law copyright (citing THE FEDERALIST No.
43 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961))).
52. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 599 (1834) ("There is, at common law, no property in [pat-
ents]; there is not even a legal right entitled to protection .... Congress, therefore, when
authorized [by the Constitution] to secure their rights, are authorized to do everything;
and full power over the subject is delegated to them."); see also Abrams, supra note 30, at
1126 ("In Wheaton, the Supreme Court set the basic assumptions for the continuing devel-
opment of copyright doctrine in the United States: copyright is strictly a creature of statute
and is not a common law property right or natural right of the author." (citing Wheaton, 33
U.S. (8 Pet.) 591)); Yen, supra note 30, at 529-31 (discussing how "Wheaton can be read as
requiring the elimination of copyright's natural law dimensions in favor of increasing em-
phasis on copyright's economic theory").
53. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
54. See generally THE OXFORD CLASSICAL DICrIONARY 907 (Simon Hornblower &
Anthony Spawforth, eds., 3d ed. 1996) (entry for "Gaius Maecenas") (chronicling the life
of the first century B.C. Roman friend of Octavian whose "name became proverbial as the
greatest patron of the poets" (citation omitted)).
530
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works.5" It was, however, significant for the later development of
copyright that around A.D. 300 Roman booksellers switched from
making their books in scrolls to the codex form, essentially "the bound
book as we know it." 6 Undoubtedly, the new form-adapted from
merchants' account books-paved the way for easier copying and re-
sulted in a more mobile and user-friendly instrument for readers.
Although they did not establish copyright concepts per se, the
Romans did pioneer the constituent elements of intangible personal
property that form the basis of copyright.57 To begin with, the Roman
concept of res, property, encompassed all things which had economic
value.5 In his popular text, An Introduction to Roman Law, Barry
Nicholas put it this way: "[T]he law of things includes all those rights
which are capable of being evaluated in money terms."59 There can
be little doubt that initially the term res ("thing") referred to physical
things, res corporales. But over time, Roman law came to recognize the
existence of intangibles, res incorporales, as well.6" The Roman jurist
Gaius was the first to discuss res incorporales as a distinct legal con-
cept." Gaius published his foundational work, the Institutes, in about
A.D. 161.62 It is most likely, however, that he did not invent it out of
whole cloth.6" It is probable that the distinction evolved during the
55. See Matthews, supra note 13, at 586 ("Even after writing was invented, and after
parchment and papyrus made it possible to preserve the labors of the poet and the histo-
rian, these authors had not, for many a century yet, any thought of making money by
multiplying copies of their works."); see also Crook, supra note 13, at 204 ("[T]here is no
sign that painters or sculptors or musicians came into any special category of dignity. Dis-
cussion amongst Romanists centres on the question under what contract payment was
made to persons of professional standing.").
56. WOLFF, supra note 13, at 140.
57. See generally BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAw 98-99 (1962) (dis-
cussing concepts of intangible property held by Roman lawyers).
58. See id. (stating that res includes physical objects such as a house and abstract things
such as debt and that both physical and abstract things are "assets of economic value"); see
also Simonds, supra note 34, at 16 (defining "property-subject-matter" as "anything capable
of reduction to personal possession and having value in exchange").
59. NICHOLAS, supra note 57, at 98.
60. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 125 ("The broad concept of res as any economic asset,
comprising incorporeal no less than corporeal elements, was one of historical develop-
ment. It is apparent that the original res of Roman Law was the physical thing, the later res
corporalis."); NICHOLAS, supra note 57, at 98 (noting that res, "[iun its simplest sense . . .
denotes merely a physical object" but that "there are also abstract things, things which exist
only in the mind's eye, such as a debt, a right of way, and many others"); supra note 58.
61. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 125-26 ("The distinction between res corporales and res
incorporales first appears in juristic literature in Gaius, though it need not be ascribed to
him." (footnote omitted)).
62. See WOLFF, supra note 13, at 120.
63. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 126-27 (analyzing the development of the notion of
res incorporales through the work of Gaius' predecessors).
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late Republic and early Empire.64 J.A.C. Thomas characterized the
recognition of intangible property as truly significant in historical ju-
risprudence: "To treat rights as things in themselves was a laudable
feat of abstraction and rationalisation."6 5 Furthermore, the Romans
recognized that, technically speaking, intangibles could not be pos-
sessed in the same manner as tangibles.66 Because they could not be
held in hand like physical objects, discrete rules regarding the sale
and transfer of res incorporales developed.67 The first res incorporales
recognized by Roman law were the "praedial servitudes."6 These ser-
vitudes-analogous in many respects to modern easements-were
four in number: iter (the right to travel over another's land); actus
(the right to drive animals over another's land); via (the right to have
a road over another's land); and, aquaeductus (the right to draw water
over another's land) .69 Eventually, in addition to servitudes like these
(intangible rights dependent upon an association with land-similar
to our easements appurtenant), Roman law also recognized personal
servitudes (somewhat similar to the modern easements in gross) that
were not tied to real property. For example, operae servorum was a kind
of personal servitude (usus) that entitled a third party to use another's
slave's services.7  In any event, copyright-as an intangible prop-
erty-is similar in some respects to the praedial servitudes. Although
a copyright is not tied directly to land, it is linked in some fashion to a
64. See id. at 126 ("The distinction [between res corporales and res incorporales] is probably
of late Republican and early imperial development.").
65. Id.; cf NICHOLAS, supra note 57, at 107 ("The distinction [between res corporales
and res incorporales] was primarily, however, an academic one, and as such was not gener-
ally used by the classical lawyers. But it . . . [has] become part of the legal language of
Europe and, to some extent, of the Common law.").
66. See NICHOLAS, supra note 57, at 111 (explaining that res incorporales "were ... incapa-
ble of being possessed"); see also Yen, supra note 30, at 538 n.138 (noting that acquisition of
incorporeal property by occupatio was inconsistent with the concept of physical possession,
possessio).
67. See infra Part V.
68. See generally WATSON, supra note 20, at 49-50 (discussing what constitutes "praedial
servitudes").
69. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 126. Thomas explained:
It would appear that the earliest res incorporales were the so-called Jura in re known
as praedial servitudes which, like ownership itself, had a physical thing, land as
the immediate object of their exercise and it would seem that the very oldest of
them, the three rights of way, iter, actus, via, and the right to draw water, aquaeduc-
tus, were originally conceived of as themselves physical things.
Id. (footnote omitted).
70. See NicHoLAs, supra note 57, at 144 (explaining that oprae servorum was a modifica-
tion of usus "applicable to... the services of slaves").
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material object, since, to be copyrightable, a work must be "fixed in
any tangible medium of expression."71
III. COPYRIGHT AS A PUBLIC GOOD: THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
One of the things that makes copyright so intriguing as an aca-
demic subject is the concept of the public domain. In American law,
works of authorship are protected by copyright if they are original
works of authorship fixed in a "tangible medium of expression ...
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise commu-
nicated either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."72 If a
work of authorship does not meet this statutory definition, it is said to
be noncopyrightable and therefore, in the public domain-owned by
the public at large and, thus, not protectable by copyright law.73 For
example, if a work is not original or if it is too ephemeral-skywriting
or a sand sculpture-it would not be copyrightable, and, therefore, in
the public domain. In addition, a work can enter the public domain
after the copyright protection is terminated by operation of law. For
example, under the first iteration of the 1976 Copyright Act, a work
could lose its protection and enter the public domain if it was pub-
lished without a valid copyright notice.74 Additionally, a work enters
the public domain after the copyright has expired. For example,
under the 1909 Copyright Act, a copyright expired after twenty-eight
years unless renewed in a timely fashion.75 Under the present law, the
general rule is that copyrights end seventy years after the author's
death.7 6 The concept here is relatively simple. Copyrightable works
are ordinarily works that benefit society by providing entertainment,
aesthetic enjoyment, and/or communicate useful information such as
educational materials.77 The system is essentially a tradeoff, like one
gigantic implied contract: the United States government grants exclu-
sive rights to authors for a limited term. In return, the public benefits
in two stages. In stage one, the period of copyright protection, the
71. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994); see also infra Part W.A.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
73. See LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 1.5[D], at 12 (describing how works that are not in
compliance with the copyright acts can be "injected into the public domain").
74. See id. § 1.5[A], at 8.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (repealed 1978) ("The copyright secured by this title shall endure
for twenty-eight years from the date of first publication.. . ."); see also LEAFFER, supra note
2, § 6.2, at 174 (comparing the twenty-eight year renewal term of the 1909 Act to the life
plus fifty years term of the 1976 Act).
76. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. 1999).
77. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (allowing the copyrighting of materials such
as "literary works," "musical works," "dramatic works," "motion pictures," and "sound
recordings").
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public ordinarily has access to the work and may use it but pays a
royalty because the author holds the exclusive rights.7" This use of
protected works during the period of copyright is in some respects
similar to the Roman law notion, usufructus. In Justinian's Institutes,
usufructus is defined as "ius alienis rebus utendi fruendi salva rerum sub-
stantia" which when translated means "a right to use and enjoy the
things of others but keeping the substance of those things intact."79
The public today may use and enjoy works protected by copyright and
may use the fruits of them-so long as those "fruits" are considered
merely ideas but not part of the protectable expression of the works.
In stage two, once the work enters the public domain, the public has
access to the work at a greatly reduced cost-nearly for free-because
it does not have to pay the author's royalty.80 It really only has to pay
production costs. For example, the price for a classical music com-
pact disk is a fraction of that of popular music.
The ancient Romans were among the first to establish expressly
and to develop the legal notion that certain types of property should
be segregated for public use and incapable of being owned by an indi-
vidual, like works in the public domain.81 Roman law distinguished
two kinds of property that are in many respects similar to works in the
public domain: res communes and res publicae.82 Gaiuss3 articulated the
distinction between public and private property: "Public things are
regarded as no one's property: for they are considered to belong to
the whole community of the people. Private things are those that be-
long to individuals."84 Those things which were classified as res com-
78. See generally LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 8.2, at 221-22 (discussing exclusive rights and
their limitations).
79. Justinian, Institutes, II. 4pr. (author's translation); see also THOMAS, supra note 20, at
203 (translating Justinian's definition of usufructus to mean "the right to use and enjoy the
things of another, their substance remaining unimpared").
80. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 302 (Supp. 1999) (allowing the work to enter the public
domain after the life of the author plus seventy years).
81. Of course works protected by copyright may be initially owned by an individual. It
is after the work enters the public domain that it becomes no longer capable of being
owned by an individual. See generally THOMAS, supra note 20, at 127 (explaining the con-
cepts res in patriminio (things capable of being owned by individuals) and res extra pa-
trimonium (things incapable of being owned by individuals)); id. at 129 ("[A]II res extra
patrimonium were characterized by their inability to be owned by an individual.").
82. See id. at 129.
83. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (noting that Gaius was the first to
discuss res incorporales as a distinct legal concept in his publication Institutes).
84. WATSON, supra note 13, at 43 (quoting Gnius, INs-nTTrEs G.2.10). Unfortunately,
we do not know much else about how the Romans conceived of public property. Accord-
ing to Watson, "Public property is not further described: what it is, how it is constituted or
acquired, particular privileges attaching to it, its alienability or otherwise, responsibility for
its upkeep, actions against violators of it-these topics are entirely missing." Id. Regarding
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munes were things like the air, the sea, and beaches.8 5 They were
"things of common enjoyment, available to all living persons by virtue
of their existence and thus incapable of private appropriation because
their utilisation was an incident of personality not of property." 6 On
the other hand, "[ries publicae differed from res communes in that they
belonged not to humanity as a whole but to the state, the papulus.
They comprised the public roads, bridges, ports, fora, or meeting
places, theatres, baths and flowing rivers. One enjoyed them as an
inhabitant of the state."
8 7
In addition to categorizing some property as res communes and res
publicae, another Roman law precept that has influenced the modern
development of the public domain is usucapio8 8 In many respects,
usucapio is similar to our modem notion of adverse possession. 9 In its
simplest terms, usucapio entitled a person to acquire ownership of
property by using that property when its original owner has apparently
abandoned it.9 ° In terms of public policy, the principle encourages
persons to make productive use of property and discourages "sleeping
on one's rights" while allowing otherwise productive property to go to
waste.9 ' Usucapio is relevant to the development of the public domain
in a subtle way. Under prior United States Copyright law, a copyright
owner could lose his copyright if he failed to assert his rights in a
number of ways. For example, under the original 1976 Act, failure to
affix a valid copyright notice and failure to renew a copyright could
each send a work into the public domain.9 2 In essence, the public
Justinian's treatment of the subject, Watson stated: "On public law he says nothing beyond
mentioning public property .... " Id. at 46 (citation omitted).
85. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 129.
86. Id.; see also Yen, supra note 30 at 522-23 (noting that objects in nature, for example,
are incapable of ownership). Yen reminded us that "the Roman notions of res communes
and ferae naturae admonish the natural law thinker not to extend copyright beyond the
bounds of what human institutions such as copyright can practicably accomplish." Id. at
547.
87. THOMAS, supra note 20, at 129 (footnote and citations omitted).
88. See id. at 157-65 (explaining the concept of usucapio).
89. See generally ROGER CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.7, at 807-15 (2d
ed. 1993) (defining and explaining the concept of adverse possession); JOHN CRIBBET &
CORWINJOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 333-38 (3d ed. 1989) (discussing the
operation of adverse possession statutes).
90. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 157-58 (explaining that under the concept of usu-
capio, "[t]he principal would appear to have been that, after the appropriate period of
possession without disturbance, the acquirer had no need to rely on the auctoritas of his
transferor since no one could thereafter successfully challenge his title").
91. See generally CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 89, § 11.7, at 814-15 (discussing the
reasons that support the doctrine of adverse possession).
92. See LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 4.11, at 125 ("Under the 1976 Act... non-compliance
with notice formalities can forfeit copyright. . .."); id. § 6.5[A]-[B], at 179 ("Failure to
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acquired "ownership" when the copyright owner abandoned her copy-
right by failing to observe formalities.
IV. COPYRIGHTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
A. Intangible Work Distinguished From The Material Object
One of the metaphysical challenges for any student of copyright
is to grasp the concept that copyrightable subject matter is distinct
from the material object in which a copyrightable work is embodied.9"
For example, a "literary work" may be embodied in book form, a
"book-on-tape," or on a compact disk. It is, however, the underlying
work itself that is protected not the physical embodiment. One of the
more interesting debates in Roman law centered around this very dis-
tinction. The Roman juristic controversy took the following form.
Imagine that A owns a parchment and that B, in good faith-without
knowing that A owns it-writes a poem on it. Or, suppose that A owns
a canvas and that B, in good faith-not knowing that the canvas be-
longs to A-paints a picture on it. Or, suppose that A owns bronze
and that B, in good faith-not knowing that the bronze belongs to
A-makes it into a statue. The simple question was, who is considered
the owner of the poem on the parchment, the painting on the canvas,
and the statue of bronze? Roman jurists gave answers that appear
somewhat inconsistent if not illogical.
It is difficult to justify the inconsistent approaches that Roman
jurists took in these situations. The first inconsistency can be seen in
the different treatment afforded to writing versus visual art. In the
case where a writer had written on another's parchment, the general
Roman law rule was that the owner of the parchment became the
owner of the entirety. 4 On the other hand, in the case where a
painter had painted on another's canvas, the general rule was the op-
posite: the painter became the owner of the whole. 5
comply with renewal formalities [under the 1976 Act] meant forfeiture of copyright to the
public domain.").
93. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994) ("Ownership of a copyright... is distinct from owner-
ship of any material object in which the work is embodied.").
94. See NICHOLAS, supra note 57, at 134 (" [L] etters will accede to the paper, even if they
are gold letters."); THOMAS, supra note 20, at 170 ("Writing acceded to the parchment, etc.,
on which it was done so that the owner of the parchment was owner of the book, essay or
the like, even though the writing might have been in gold leaf. .. ").
95. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 170-71 ("[I] f one person painted a picture on a tablet
belonging to another, the painter was the owner of the picture; in short, the tablet acceded
to the painting."); see also NICHOLAS, supra note 57, at 134 ("[I]t was eventually held that
the canvas acceded to the painting. It is difficult, however, to formulate any principle
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In the case of a sculptor who turns another's bronze into a statue,
there are subtle factors that may affect the analysis. Roman jurists ob-
served that the statue was actually a nova species, a new kind of thing.96
The two prominent juristic schools, the Sabinians and the Procu-
lians,9v initially adopted different points of view on ownership in these
situations. The Sabinians gave ownership to the owner of the materi-
als.9" The Proculians gave ownership to the person who made the
nova species.99 This method of acquisition-by making a nova species-
was called specificatio.1°° A third approach (media sententia) was ap-
proved byJustinian: if the nova species could be restored to its original
state, then the material owner was the owner of the new thing, but if it
could not be restored, then the sculptor was the owner.101 Also under
Justinian, if the sculptor had contributed "any part of the material, the
nova species should belong to him.... "1"
The legal acumen required just to ask this question reveals an
appreciation of the concept that there is a significant distinction be-
tween an underlying artistic work and the physical object in which
that work is embodied. Simply owning a physical object does not nec-
essarily make a person the owner of the intangible work fixed
therein. 0 3 And this is the very same concept that operates in modern
copyright law in distinguishing a material object from an underlying
intangible work of authorship.
which will account for this, since the canvas is acceding to something which had no previ-
ous existence and could have no existence without the canvas.").
96. See NIcHOLAS, supra note 57, at 136 ("Two things may be so united that the identity
of the resulting thing is different from that of either of the original two. Or a single thing
may be so worked upon that its identity is changed. There is in short, a new thing (nova
species).").
97. See generally THOMAS, supra note 20, at 45-47 (discussing the development of the two
schools). According to Thomas, "[t]he schools ofjurists became apparent in the first cen-
tury of the Principate. They are traditionally known as the Sabinians and the Proculians
but they are not named after their respective alleged founders. .. ." Id. at 45. Addition-
ally, according to Thomas, it is certain that "all the great lawyers of the first one hundred
and fifty years of the empire belonged to one or other of the schools." Id.
98. See NICHOLAS, supra note 57, at 136.
99. See id. at 137 ("The Proculians gave ownership to the maker. He acquired by ... his
act of making a nova species.").
100. See id.
101. See id. (explaining that the doctrine of media sententia would give the nova species to
the maker "only if the materials could not be returned to their former state").
102. Id.
103. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text (discussing various theories to deter-
mine ownership when copyrightable subject matter is distinct from the material object in
which it is embodied).
2000]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
B. Types of Copyrightable Works
Section 102 of the Copyright Act enumerates a nonexclusive list
of types of "works of authorship."'104 Among these types are literary
works, musical works, dramatic works, pictorial, graphic, and sculp-
tural works, and motion pictures.10 5 But on a more abstract level,
American copyright law protects only three basic types of works: (1)
Compilations, (2) Derivative works, and (3) Free Standing works. 10 6
This tripartite typology uses, as a basis for classification, the manner in
which a work is created rather than its lay-genre.'0 7 This typology ex-
amines the nature of "originality" in a work.10 8 Generally speaking, a
work is copyrightable as a compilation when its originality stems from
the selection, coordination, or arrangement of constituent ele-
ments.0 9 A work is protectable as a derivative work when its original-
ity is manifest by transforming, adapting, or recasting the work on
which the derivative is based." 0 A free standing work is protectable by
copyright because its originality is such that it bears no substantial sim-
ilarity to any other work to which its author has had previous access."'
Simply put, a free standing work is an original work of authorship that
is neither a compilation of preexisting elements nor a derivative based
on a another preexisting work." 2 It is with respect to this abstract,
tripartite typology that Roman law sheds light on modern copyright
concepts that relate to the "types" of copyrightable works and the no-
tion of "originality."
104. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)-(8) (1994).
105. See id.
106. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1994) (defining compilations and derivative works and
including them as subject matter for copyright protection); see also Russ VerSteeg, Rethink-
ing Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 801, 814-18 (1993) (discussing derivative works and
compilations as explicitly defined by the statute and defining the nonstatutory category of
freestanding works).
107. SeeVerSteeg, supra note 106, at 814-17 (categorizing works into compilations, deriv-
ative works, or free standing according to how the works were developed).
108. See id. at 817-18 ("To evaluate the originality of a work in a coherent manner, a
decisionmaker first must determine whether it should be characterized as a compilation, a
derivative work, or a freestanding work.").
109. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("A 'compilation' is a work formed by the collection and assem-
bling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such
a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship."); see
also VerSteeg, supra note 106, at 814 (construing 17 U.S.C. § 101).
110. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexist-
ing works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, mo-
tion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.").
111. See VerSteeg, supra note 106, at 816-17 ("As a general rule, a freestanding work is a
work that is not substantially similar to any preexisting works or materials.").
112. See id.
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Interestingly, the Roman jurist Sextus Pomponius" explained all
property in similar terms. According to Pomponius, there were first
corpora quae uno spiritu continentur, things which are held together as a
single entity; second, corpora quae ex cohaerentibus corporis sunt, things
which exist through cohesion with other things; and, third, corpora
quae ex distantibus corporibus sunt, things which are comprised of dis-
tinct other things.' 1 4 J.A.C. Thomas elaborated: "Examples of the
first category would be a slave, a block of wood, a stone, and so forth;
of the second, a house which is built of various materials or a ship or a
cupboard; the last category may be illustrated by a legion or a flock or
herd.""' Pomponius' corpora quae uno spiritu continentur are similar in
many respects to free-standing works; works that stand on their own
two feet, without being derivative and without being compilations.
The corpora quae ex cohaerentibus corporis sunt are in some ways like de-
rivative works (at least when the base work remains substantially simi-
lar to its initial state, even after other material has been added or the
base work itself has been changed) and also like compilations (when
preexisting materials are blended). Corpora quae ex distantibus
corporibus sunt are analogous to a collective work, which is a specific
kind of compilation that results when "a number of contributions,
constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are as-
sembled into a collective whole." '116 The crux of the distinctions
among these three is the same as it is in modern copyright law. The
ownership of the work upon which a derivative is based or the preex-
isting materials that comprise a compilation or collective is not af-
fected by the originality attributed to the author of that derivative or
compilation. 1 '
Other Roman law principles are instructive in determining the
ownership of free standing works, derivative works and compilations.
Specifically, occupatio is pertinent to comprehending the ownership of
free standing works, accessio helps to explain derivative works, and adi-
unctio lends insight into collective works.
113. Pomponius was roughly a contemporary of Gaius-living around the reigns of Ha-
drian, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 117-180). See generally NICHOLAS, supra
note 57, at 31-32 (discussing Pomponius' writing about Augustus); WOLFF, supra note 13, at
119-20 (discussing the importance of Pomponius's activities as a writer and as a teacher).
114. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 131.
115. Id.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
117. See id. § 103(b) ("The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to
the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting
material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting
material.").
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Occupatio is relevant regarding the initial ownership of free stand-
ing works. Occupatio was "the acquisition of ownership of a thing
which has no owner (res nullius) by taking possession of it."" 8 A com-
mon example of acquiring ownership of a res nullius by occupatio is the
capture of a wild animal. 9 In some respects, acquisition by occupatio
is analogous to creation of a free standing work. In each case some-
one-the author or occupator-becomes the initial owner of a thing by
virtue of being the first to take hold of it. The analogy is clearly not
perfect, since with occupatio the owner merely seizes a res that already
existed in nature; whereas, when an author creates a free standing
work, she makes something that is neither derivative nor merely a col-
lection of the works of others.
The Roman law notion of accessio' ° adds to our understanding of
derivative works-works based upon one or more preexisting
works. 1 2 1 To appreciate the contribution of Roman law to derivative
works, it is important to note three things about derivative works.
First, a derivative work must bear substantial similarity to the work
upon which it is based, and the derivative author's contribution must
be original.122 Second, the owner of any copyrightable work owns the
exclusive right to make or authorize derivatives. 123 Third, a derivative
author acquires no copyright when she makes an unauthorized deriva-
tive work.
124
118. NICHOLAS, supra note 57, at 130; see alsoYen, supra note 30, at 522 ("[T]he primary
form of [Roman] acquisition was the natural law principle of occupancy, or occupatio.").
119. See NICHOLAS, supra note 57, at 130-31 ("[T]he only res nullius which are commonly
encountered in everyday life are wild animals, and it is in regard to them that occupatio is
mainly discussed."); see alsoYen, supra note 30, at 522-23 ("If a wild animal escaped ... it no
longer belonged to its original owner and could become the property of its next captor."
(citation omitted)).
120. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 169-74 (defining accessio as ownership by incorpora-
tion into something already owned by the acquirer, and categorizing instances of accessio);
see also supra notes 95-103 (discussing accessio in the context of distinguishing a material
object from an underlying, intangible work of authorship).
121. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (defining a derivative work).
122. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (including in the definition of derivative work the requirement
that the work "as a whole, represent an original work of authorship" (emphasis added)); see
also VerSteeg, supra note 106, at 817 (explaining that for a work to be considered a "deriva-
tive work," it must be "substantially similar" to a preexisting work).
123. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) ("[T]he owner of copyright... has the exclusive rights to...
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work .... ").
124. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) ("[P]rotection for a work employing preexisting material in
which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has
been used unlawfully.").
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In Roman law, accessio was a means by which one could acquire
ownership of tangible property.'25 According to Thomas, "[a] ccessio
was the acquisition of ownership of a tangible thing by its incorpora-
tion into something which already belonged to the acquirer .... 126
Barry Nicholas explained the concept as follows:
If the identity of one thing (the accessory) is merged and lost
in the identity of the other (the principal) the owner of the
principal is the owner of the whole. In the example of the
cup and the handle, the owner of the cup is the owner of the
cup-with-handle. There is said to be accessio.
1 27
The principle of ownership by accessio is, therefore, analogous to the
principle in copyright law that gives the owner of the work upon
which a derivative is based (the principal) exclusive rights superior to
the claims of the derivative author (the author of the accessory). A
derivative/accessory author must use the work upon which her work is
based (the principal) lawfully 2' as a prerequisite to obtaining a copy-
right for her derivative.' 29 Furthermore, it is useful to recall that, by
definition, a derivative author recasts, transforms, or adapts the princi-
pal work in such a way that the resulting work is still substantially simi-
lar to the principal work.13° This comports with the Roman concept
of accessio because, in accessio, "the thing acquired should have been
incorporated in the other in so subordinate a manner that it lost its
identity .... ,131 In other words, the audience recognizes the deriva-
tive as having been based on a preexisting archetype, not as a free
standing work.
Adiunctio is a concept that is relevant to compilations, particularly
collective works. It is easiest to explain adiunctio by example. Imagine
that one person owned a chariot and another owned a chariot wheel.
If one of those individuals attached the wheel to the chariot, the mere
joining of the two objects did not affect the ownership of them as
125. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (defining the Roman law notion of
accessio).
126. THOMAS, supra note 20, at 169.
127. NICHOLAS, supra note 57, at 133.
128. Presumably "lawfully" means either with permission or within the bounds of fair
use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (listing the factors to be considered when assessing fair use of a
copyrighted work).
129. See id. § 103(a) (precluding copyright status from being conferred upon work
which has been used unlawfully).
130. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (defining derivative work); see also supra
note 123 and accompanying text (discussing the substantial similarity requirement for de-
rivative work).
131. THOMAS, supra note 20, at 169.
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separate items of property. 132 The separability of the things was a crit-
ical factor. This same principle governs the ownership of collective
works where, by definition, "a number of contributions, constituting
separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a
collective whole. 1 33 The Copyright Act states: "Copyright in each
separate contribution to a collective work is distinct from copyright in
the collective work as a whole, and vests initially in the author of the
contribution." '134 The Romans understood the same principle; if sepa-
rate items owned by different individuals were combined, so long as
each item could be detached, the ownership of those independent
items remained intact.
13 5
V. SALE AND OTHER TRANSFER OF INTANGIBLES
In the Copyright Act, two key provisions articulate the essential
rules regarding the sale and transfer of copyright ownership. Section
201(d) (1) provides: "The ownership of a copyright may be trans-
ferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation
of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by
the applicable laws of intestate succession. "136 Section 204(a) states:
"A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is
not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memoran-
dum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights
conveyed... ."37 These provisions basically carry two messages. First,
one may transfer copyright ownership in practically any legal way im-
aginable, and second, generally speaking, one must memorialize a
transfer of copyright in a writing signed by the transferor.' 3 8 Legal
historian W.F. Wyndham Brown has noted that written proof of a
transfer of copyright has been required for over two hundred years:
"The person who had registered his rights in the books of the [Sta-
tioners'] Company was the owner, and he might assign those rights to
132. As Thomas explained:
Adiunctio was the separable attachment of one object to another, e.g. the affixing
of a wheel to a chariot: if the objects belonged to two different persons, no
change of ownership resulted and either party could . . .recover his property,
however subordinate it might be to the object to which it was affixed.
Id.
133. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
134. Id. § 201(c).
135. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of adiunctio).
136. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (d)(1).
137. Id. § 204(a).
138. See LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 5.8 [A], at 163-64 (discussing the divisibility of copyright
interests).
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others, provided the title of the assignee was also entered on the
register.,"139
Roman law permitted the transfer of res incorporales.140 As a mat-
ter of fact, certain res incorporales were among the most treasured kinds
of property in ancient Italy. 4' Perhaps, the leap from merely recog-
nizing the legal existence of intangible property to establishing a
means by which to transfer it is not so monumental; Roman law how-
ever, did, at least accomplish that leap.'42 Moreover, as is the case
with transfer of copyright ownership today, the Romans required spe-
cial formalities to ensure the validity of a sale of an intangible right.1 43
In Roman law, there were many different modes by which one
could transfer ownership of property. 144 The most significant for our
purposes are traditio, in iure cessio, and mancipatio.
Traditio was the most common method of transferring tangible
personal property.145 It involved a physical transfer of an object from
one person to another, along with the intention of the transferor to
give up all of his rights to that thing and the corresponding intention
of the transferee to accept the same. 146  Clearly, when someone
wished to transfer ownership of a res incorporales, traditio was not an
option, because there was no physical thing to hand over.' 4 7
139. Brown, supra note 29, at 57.
140. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 281-82. Thomas explained:
[S]ale of virtually anything was possible, corporeal or incorporeal: hence there
could be a valid sale of book debts, servitudes, praedial or personal, an inheri-
tance and the like. In general, the thing had to be in existence at the time of the
sale but it was possible to conclude a valid contract in respect of res corporales the
existence of which was only potential e.g. "next year's crop from that field" or the
unborn child of a slave woman.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
141. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (discussing the praedial servitudes).
142. See CROOK, supra note 13, at 218 ("Most things could be objects of a valid sale,
including inheritances, servitudes, and the right to collect debts. You could have sale of
something from a stock of things, or sale of a future thing. .. ").
143. See infra notes 148-151 and accompanying text (discussing in iure cessio, the method
of transferring intangibles as developed by the Romans).
144. See generally WATSON, supra note 20, at 45-48 (discussing the various forms of acquisi-
tion of ownership possible under Roman law).
145. See id. at 47 ("The main way of acquiring ownership .. . was by traditio, delivery.").
146. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 181 ("The requirements of an effective traditio, apart
from the factual transfer, were an intent on the part of the person by, or in whose name, it
was transferred to give ownership of the actual thing delivered to the person by, or in
whose name, it was received."); WATSON, supra note 20, at 47 ("Actual physical delivery-
though no further formalities-was usually required [to effect a traditio].").
147. See NICHOLAS, supra note 57, at 106 ("[Ilncorporeal things [could] neither be ac-
quired by usucaptio nor conveyed by traditio."); WATSON, supra note 20, at 44 ("[Traditio] ...
was impossible when the thing was incorporeal, and a different method (in iure cessio) had
to be used.").
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The method of transferring intangibles that the Romans devel-
oped was called in iure cessio. 48 In some respects, in iure cessio was like
a quiet tile action in which the parties were conspiring. Alan Watson
described the procedure as follows: "The transferor and transferee
would appear before the magistrate, the transferee would claim that
the thing was his, the transferor (who was the true owner) would not
put up a counterclaim, and so the magistrate would adjudge the thing
to the transferee."' 49 This method was used by an ancient Roman, for
example, for transferring a common intangible-an inheritance.150
The significant thing for purposes of copyright law is that in iure cessio,
as a means for transferring intangibles, required a formal public pro-
cess.15' The public nature of the transfer makes it more verifiable.
To understand mancipatio, it is first necessary to review two cate-
gories of Roman property. Among the many classifications that the
Roman jurists used for property were the categories res mancipi and res
nec mancipi.'52 Simply stated, the ancient Romans decided that certain
types of property, known as res mancipi, were so important that to
transfer them validly, one had to observe certain formalities as part of
the transfer process. 5 This special transfer process, called mancipa-
tio, included the presence of five witnesses, all Roman males over the
age of puberty, and a sixth with the same qualifications to hold a
scale. 154 The transferee held the object to be transferred and, striking
the scale, stated that the object was his.15 5 Generally speaking, res
mancipi were originally things that were important for the well being
of an agricultural community: Italic land, slaves, cattle, horses, mules,
148. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 156 ("In practice, therefore, in developed law, cessio in
iure was principally associated with the creation, transfer and extinction of res incorporales.");
WATSON, supra note 20, at 46 ("Since in iure cessio was rather cumbersome, it was used only
sparingly, but it had to be used, as the sole possible method of transfer, when what was to
be transferred was an incorporeal thing such as a servitude right.").
149. WATSON, supra note 20, at 46.
150. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 481 (explaining that "in some cases, the heir could
transfer the inheritance to another.., by cessio in iure hereditas").
151. See id. at 155 ("[C]essio in iure was a mode of transfer and acquisition which re-
quired publicity.").
152. See NICHOLAS, supra note 57, at 105-06 (describing res mancipi as "slaves, beasts of
draught and burden (oxen, horses, asses, mules), Italic land, and rustic praedial servitudes
. . . over such land" while defining all other things as res nec mancipi).
153. See id. at 106 ("The practical importance of the distinction [between res mancipi and
res nec mancipi] was that res mancipi could only be conveyed by mancipatio ... or in lure cessio;
a mere delivery was ineffective to pass ownership."); WATSON, supra note 20, at 45 ("In
historical times mancipato was, in its ordinary form, the usual method of transferring res
mancipi.").
154. See WATSON, supra note 20, at 45.
155. Id.
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asses, and the four praedial servitudes.' 56 The four praedial servi-
tudes, interestingly, were intangibles: iter ("the right of access across a
neighbor's land"); actus ("the right to drive cattle across"); via ("the
right to have a road across"); and, aquaeductus ("the right to have an
aqueduct across a neighbor's land")."' As the law developed, these
servitudes could be transferred by either mancipatio or in iure cessio.158
Like copyrights today, these praedial servitudes were considered so
vital to Roman society that a formal public procedure was required for
a valid transfer of ownership. Since these intangible rights are essen-
tially in rem, it is essential to have a public and verifiable transfer.1 59
VI. JOINT AUTHORSHIP AND WoRK FOR HiRE
In modern American copyright law, the author of a work is con-
sidered the initial owner of a copyright.16 In addition, however, the
Copyright Act provides special rules for ownership in two situations:
(1) instances of joint authorship;' 61 and, (2) instances of work made
for hire.16 2 Simply stated, a work is a work of joint authorship when
two or more authors combine their contributions into one work. 163 A
work for hire results in two ways: (1) when an employee creates a
copyrightable work within the scope of his or her employment; 164 or,
(2) when an independent contractor creates a work for a commission-
ing party, provided that two other criteria are satisfied: (a) the type of
work created must be within one of the nine categories specified in
156. See id. ("The list [of res mancipi] covers the most important things in a primitive
farming community."); see also supra notes 68-69, 152.
157. See NICHOLAS, supra note 57, at 105-06 (explaining that among res mancipi were the
"rustic praedial servitudes (e.g. rights of way and of water) over such land."); see also WAT-
SON, supra note 20, at 49 (listing inter, actus, via, and aquaeductus as the four earliest types of
servitudes).
158. See WATSON, supra note 20, at 50 ("[T]he four original servitudes could be created
by mancipato, and all of them could be created by in iure cessio. But since servitudes were
incorporeal rights, traditio was not appropriate.").
159. See NICHOLAS, supra note 57, at 103 (articulating the principle that, because in rem
rights potentially affect everyone, they should not be secretly created or transferred).
160. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994) ("Copyright in a work.., vests initially in the author
or authors of the work.").
161. See id. § 101 (defining 'Joint work"); id. § 201 (a) ("The authors of ajoint work are
co-owners of copyright in the work.").
162. See id. § 101 (defining "work made for hire"); id. § 201(b) ("In the case of a work
made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is consid-
ered the author ... and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written
statement signed by them, owns all the rights comprised in the copyright.").
163. See id. ("A joint work' is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention
that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole.").
164. See LFAFFER, supra note 2, § 5.2, at 148-50 (discussing 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b)).
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the definition of "work made for hire" articulated in section 101 (2) of
the Copyright Act;' 65 and, (b) both the independent contractor and
commissioning party must sign a "written instrument" stating that the
work is a "work made for hire."' 66
Joint authorship arises in American copyright when "two or more
authors" prepare a work "with the intention that their contributions
be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole." 6 ' In Roman law, the institution known as societas bore a great
deal of similarity to joint copyright authorship.'68 Technically, societas
was a kind of partnership contract.169 The majority rule in American
copyright law requires that each joint author contribute something
that is copyrightable. 70 In Roman law, a partner could contribute
assets, work, or advice.' 7 ' The critical element, however, in joint au-
thorship for copyright is intent. The putative joint authors must in-
tend to merge their contributions.' 72 Similarly, in Roman societas,
intent was the sine qua non.'73 J.A.C. Thomas emphasized this point by
stating that "[i] n any form, societas required an intention of associa-
165. See id. (explaining 17 U.S.C. § 101). The nine categories enumerated in the provi-
sion are as follows: (1) contribution to a collective work; (2) part of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work; (3) a translation; (4) a supplementary work; (5) a compilation; (6)
an instructional text; (7) a test; (8) answer material for a test; and, (9) an atlas. 17 U.S.C.
§ 101(2); see also LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 5.2 [B], at 149-50 (enumerating these nine
categories).
166. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "work made for hire").
167. Id.
168. In particular, a partnership made for one instance, societas unius rei, in a fashion
similar to ajoint venture, is analogous. See THoMAS, supra note 20, at 301 ("Societas unius rei
was an association for a single operation which need not be commercial, e.g., neighbors
combining to erect a party wall between their respective properties." (citation omitted)).
169. See id. at 300 (explaining that societas "was the Roman form of partnership and
consisted in an association of two or more in a common enterprise with a view to their
mutual advantage; which need not, as in modern English Law, be pecuniary"); WATSON,
supra note 20, at 65 (stating that in a societas, "[ejach partner could contribute assets, his
work, or both, and there was no need for the contributions of the partners to be equal
.. [;] unless it was specifically agreed otherwise, every partner shared equally in any profit
or loss").
170. I have argued elsewhere that this requirement must be understood to mean not
that a putative author is required to contribute something that is "fixed in a tangible me-
dium of expression," but rather that her contribution must be original expression-as op-
posed to merely an idea. See Russ VerSteeg, Defining "Author" For Purposes of Copyright, 45
AM. U. L. REV. 1323, 1339-40 (1996).
171. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 300 ("The essence of the [partnership] contract was a
pooling of resources-capital, expertise or labour-for a common purpose .. " (citation
omitted)).
172. See LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 5.4[A], at 155 ("What counts [in forming ajoint work]
is that the authors intended their respective labors to be integrated into one work." (empha-
sis added)).
173. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 301.
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tion... and was based on mutual trust of the partners between whom
it created a kind of brotherhood."174 Under copyright laws, because
joint authors are considered tenants in common, ajoint author is per-
mitted to sell or otherwise to transfer a nonexclusive license for the
copyright without the permission of his fellowjoint authors. 17 5 Ajoint
author is, however, required to make an accounting to his joint au-
thors for their equal shares of any profit. 17 The rule for societas was
similar: "If one partner had sold property belonging to the firm, he
had to divide the price with his colleagues, taking security for any lia-
bility that might result from the sale."
177
The fundamental principle that undergirds the concept of work
made for hire is the notion that copyrightable work created by A may
be considered owned by-and indeed authored by-B due to some
preexisting relationship and/or agreement between A and B.171 In
Roman law, several legal principles existed that operated in a similar
manner. One such principle functioned to make work done by a slave
or by a freedman inure to his master or former master (patron) .179 A
Roman patron's ownership interest in his freedman's property was so
strong that he even acquired his freedman's property upon death. 8 °
In a similar fashion, a Roman head of family, the paterfamilias, was
considered owner of things acquired by family members, even if he
was unaware of the acquisition. 81 In these instances, it is the master-
servant-type relationship between the parties that gives the dominant
person property ownership: master-slave; patron-freedman; and, pater-
174. Id. (citation omitted).
175. See LEAFsER, supra note 2, § 5.4[C], at 158 ("As a result [of creating a joint work],
each co-owner can use or license the whole work as he wishes . . .
176. See id. § 5.4[C], at 158 ("[T]he only obligation is a duty to account for profits to the
other joint owner. What a joint owner cannot do is transfer all interest in the work-that
is, assign the work or grant an exclusive license in it without the written consent of the
other co-owners." (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1994)).
177. THOMAS, supra note 20, at 303 (citation omitted).
178. See supra notes 164-166 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement neces-
sary to create a "work for hire").
179. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 185 (stating that "[a] person may acquire both owner-
ship and possession through" slaves and "through independent free man"); see also CROOK,
supra note 13, at 191 ("The freedman doing his obligatory work for a... [patron] was, in
labor terms, just an extension of the slave in the less sordid levels of his activity . . ").
180. See CROOK, supra note 13, at 53 ("Another category of rights of patron over freed-
man was automatic; it gave him a hold over his freedman's property, especially on death.").
181. SeeTHOMAS, supra note 20, at 185 ("[A]nything acquired by afilius ... vested forth-
with in his ... pater .... even though the acquisition was effected without his consent."); id.
at 186 ("In the case of acquisition through a peculium administered by a member of the
family, the paterfamilias was held to acquire even without particular knowledge of the trans-
action effected . . .).
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familias-family member. 182 In copyright law, the same is true. The
employer-master owns copyrightable works created by the employee-
servant.18 3 In fact, in its famous decision, Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid,'84 the United States Supreme Court held that com-
mon law principles of agency must determine whether a master-ser-
vant relationship exists in the employer-employee analysis for work for
hire.' 8 5
As regards work for hire in the context of a specially ordered or
commissioned work done by an independent contractor, modern
American copyright law is more complicated. Not only must the par-
ties agree that the work to be produced shall be considered "work
made for hire" (owned and "authored" by the commissioning party),
but the agreement must be in writing, signed by the independent con-
tractor, and the type of work must be of a particular kind. 186 Here the
agreement between the parties and the nature of the copyrighted
work are the critical factors. There is no perfect analogue in Roman
law. The closest were two peculiar sub-species of the contract known
182. In passing, it is probably worth noting that the core concept here is essentially the
same concept that operates in an inverse manner to make a master liable for the wrongs of
his servant, vicarious liability. This inverse principle applied in Roman law as well. See
CROOK, supra note 13, at 164 ("When a slave wounds or kills with his master's knowledge
the master is undoubtedly liable .... Knowledge here means sufferance, i.e. he who could
have stopped it is liable if he failed to do so." (quoting Justinian's Digest (44.1-45 pr.) (in-
ternal quotations omitted))); id. at 56 ("If [a slave] commits offences his master can
choose between paying damages and handing him over."); THOMAS, supra note 20, at 382,
396 (explaining that masters were liable for delicts committed by their slaves); WATSON,
supra note 13, at 32 (describing an action "against a ship's captain, innkeeper, or st-
ablekeeper for any theft or fraud committed in the ship or building by an employee" (empha-
sis added)). Thomas further explained:
Assuming the complete absence of complicity of the pater or dominus in the mat-
ter, if a delict was committed by a member of the family, the head of the family
was subjected to noxal liability, i.e. he had either personally to assume responsibil-
ity and be liable for damages or to hand over the aggrieved party the errant mem-
ber of his family (noxae deditio). This was provided already for furtum by the
Twelve Tables, was extended to the other delicts and, in developed law, was a
generally accepted principle.
Id. at 381 (footnotes and citations omitted).
183. See LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 5.2[A], at 148 ("For a work made for hire, initial owner-
ship vests in the employer .... [T]he employer-author has the entire right to the work;
the employee-creator has no ownership rights whatsoever.").
184. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
185. Id. at 740 (concluding that "Congress intended to describe the conventional
master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.").
186. See supra notes 164-166 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of a
"work made for hire").
[VOL. 59:522
THE ROMAN LAW ROOTS OF COPYRIGHT
as locatio conductio:'87 locatio conductio operis faciendi; and, locatio conduc-
tio operarum. Locatio conductio operisfaciendi "was the placing of a con-
tract for some work to be done or, more accurately, for the
production of a specified result for reward, the person commissioning
the enterprise being the locator and the party contracting to produce
the result, the conductor."' 8 Locatio conductio operarum "was the letting
of one's services for reward, the workman being the locator and the
employer, conductor."'8 9 In both of these contracts, the locator became
owner of the work produced by virtue of the contract. Aside from the
limitation as to subject matter,19 ° it is also the agreement of the par-
ties, in American copyright law, that determines whether a work that is
specially ordered or commissioned may be considered work made for
hire.19'
VII. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
There are at least five Roman legal principles or concepts that, by
analogy, add to our understanding of copyright infringement: (1)
recognition of intangible injuries; (2) iniuria (damage); (3) furtum
(theft); (4) injunctions as remedies; and, (5) persons other than own-
ers of the whole may have standing.
Since copyright is an intangible property (res incorporales), for a
cause of action for infringement to exist at all, a legal system must first
recognize intangible injuries as actionable. Roman law clearly did.
Although an action for iniuria was originally only applicable for physi-
cal/tangible injuries,'92 as the law developed, it eventually applied to
intangible injuries as well ("verbal assaults").' Interestingly, there
was a time when iniuria was understood to encompass unintentional
wrongs as well as intentional ones: it "could be committed without
187. See generally THOMAS, supra note 20, at 292-300 (discussing the concept of locatio
conductio); WATSON, supra note 20, at 64-65 (discussing the early development of locatio
conductio).
188. THOMAS, supra note 20, at 296 (footnotes and citation omitted); see also WATSON,
supra note 20, at 64 ("In hire of a work to be done (locatio operisfaciendi), the person hired
agreed to produce a certain result on a person or thing supplied to him by the hirer.").
189. THOMAS, supra note 20, at 297-98.
190. To be considered "a work made for hire" under 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2) (1994), a work
must fall within one of the nine enumerated categories. See supra note 165 and accompa-
nying text (listing the nine enumerated categories).
191. Specifically, the agreement must be in writing, it must state that the work is a work
made for hire, and it must be signed by the independent contractor. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
192. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 369 (noting that originally, iniuria was "clearly con-
cerned [only] with physical injury").
193. SeeWATSON, supra note 13, at 31 (explaining that iniuria "was eventually extended
to verbal assaults").
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intention."' 9 4 In this regard, the oldest iniuria was similar to copyright
infringement. 195 But as the law of iniuria evolved, intent did become
a necessary element.19 6 Presently, intent serves as a factor that may
increase damages for copyright infringement; rather than being an
element of a prima facie case.
19 7
Another ancient Roman cause of action that was somewhat analo-
gous to modern copyright infringement is furtum, theft. J.A.C.
Thomas translated the definition of furtum from the Institutes as fol-
lows: "Theft is fraudulent interference with a thing, whether with the
thing itself or the use or possession of it: which is forbidden by natu-
ral law." '9 8 This definition is broad enough to include within its scope
an intangible injury like copyright infringement. And, during the Ro-
man republic, the concept of furtum expanded further to include "any
conduct designed to deprive another of his property."'9 9 But unlike
modern copyright infringement, there was also an intent requirement
for furtum:
To take a thing in belief that the victim did not mind, even
though events proved that he did, and, a fortiori, in pursu-
ance of a claim made in good faith would not constitute fur-
tum, any more than would dealing with the thing with the
intention of thriving, when in truth the supposed victim was
amenable to what was done.2 ° °
In addition, for a thing to be the object of furtum it had to be mobilis
(movable) .201 Thus land was not deemed subject to furtum. 2° 2 By
analogy, it is highly unlikely that intangibles would have been subject
to furtum either.20 3
Thus, although there are technical differences, the central theo-
ries at the heart of both iniuria and furtum are also central to our
modern theories of copyright infringement: a defendant is liable for
194. THOMAS, supra note 20, at 365 (citation omitted).
195. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2) (discussing the concept of "innocent infringement").
196. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 369 ("In developed law, ... iniuria meant, generally,
any deliberate affront, insult or contumely to another .... (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added)); id. at 370 ("Being grounded in contumelia, iniuria postulated intention. There
could not be a negligent iniuria ... .").
197. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2) ("[W]here the copyright owner sustains the burden
of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its
discretion may increase the award of statutory damages ...").
198. THOMAS, supra note 20, at 353. This is Thomas's translation of Institutes IV.1.1.
199. Id. at 354.
200. Id. (citation omitted).
201. See id. at 355.
202. See id. ("[I]t became settled law that there could be no theft of land.").
203. See id. at 355.
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damages when he either damages another's property or takes it from
him without permission; and, intangible injury is redressable in a
manner similar to tangible injury.
In addition to these core concepts, the modern use of injunctive
relief is also similar to the ancient Roman principles. One of the most
important remedies available to a copyright plaintiff is an injunc-
tion.2 0 4 An injunction is especially valuable in intellectual property
litigation because an injunction, in essence, stops the bleeding. It pre-
vents a defendant from continuing to harm a plaintiffs interests and
also prevents him from continuing to profit. Roman law also recog-
nized that some special circumstances necessitated the granting of an
injunction when a plaintiff feared immediate anticipated harm.2 °5
Not only was a plaintiff given the opportunity, in certain cases, to
seek injunctive relief, but Roman law also recognized that persons
with a valid interest in a res also had the right to sue for damage or loss
even if they were not, technically speaking, the owner of the res.20 6 In
copyright, the same principle operates. The Copyright Act provides
that any "legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copy-
right is entitled ... to institute an action for any infringement of that
particular right .... "207 This excludes a nonexclusive licensee from
standing2 8 but ensures that an exclusive licensee may sue. 2 09 The Ro-
man law rule appears to have been somewhat broader, but by ex-
panding the potential pool of plaintiffs to include exclusive licensees,
the copyright law takes the same basic approach as the Roman law;
granting standing to those with a sufficient interest in the res.2 1°
204. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 503 (1994) (stating the different remedies that are
available for copyright infringement); LEAFFER, supra note 2, §§ 9.8-9.9, at 300-01 (discuss-
ing the test for granting injunctions for copyright violations and resulting remedies
thereof).
205. See CROOK, supra note 13, at 166. Crook stated:
[One] set of rules went under the tide of damnum infectum, 'damage not yet
done.' If you had reason to fear that someone's neglect of his building or other
property was likely to do harm to yours you could apply to the authorities and
(having sworn that your proceedings were not vexatious) require him to give se-
curity or make promises to make good any damage caused; his refusal in this case
would lead to your being given possession of the property concerned.
Id.
206. See infra note 210 and accompanying text (providing examples of those given a
right to sue for damage who did not technically own the res).
207. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b).
208. See LEAFFER, supra note 2, § 9.18, at 312 (explaining that "the non-exclusive licensee
has no standing to bring suit" in a copyright action).
209. See id. ("The owner of an exclusive right may bring suit on his own behalf without
having to join the licensor of the right in the action.").
210. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 356 ("It may be said generally that anyone with a
sufficient interest, interesse, in the thing could bring [an action]; more specifically, that a
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CONCLUSION
Modern copyright law is constantly challenged by new technol-
ogy. This is one of the reasons why copyright is so appealing for law-
yers and law students alike. The answers that we have today do not
always serve us well tomorrow; and yesterday's answers are often all
but forgotten. Nevertheless, it is important to remain focused on fun-
damental rules, purposes, goals, and policies when confronted and
confounded by new questions. The thesis of this Article has been a
simple one. A number of legal principles that developed in ancient
Roman law have evolved as central precepts in modern copyright law.
In particular, Roman law theories help to explain analogous princi-
ples in modern copyright: namely, theories of intangible property,
public property (the public domain), the metaphysical components of
property as a legal concept (types of copyrightable works), ownership
(e.g., joint authorship and work for hire), the sale of copyrights, and
theft and/or damage to property (infringement). It is apparent that
Roman legal principles form the essential building blocks of many
concepts that comprise contemporary copyright doctrine. Therefore,
these ancient principles ought to be considered in any thoughtful
analysis of modern copyright, even in this age of digital technology.
person who had an interest in the non-disappearance or destruction of the thing could
bring [an action]." (footnote omitted)).
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